Doing the Right Thing?: Toward a Postmodern Politics by Hutchinson, Allan C.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship
1992
Doing the Right Thing?: Toward a Postmodern
Politics
Allan C. Hutchinson
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ahutchinson@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Recommended Citation
Hutchinson, Allan C. "Doing the Right Thing?: Toward a Postmodern Politics." Law and Society Review 26.4 (1992): 773-788.
A Postmodern' s Hart: Taking Rules Sceptically 
Allan C. Hutchinson
*
 
It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The mystery of the world is the 
visible, not the invisible. Oscar Wilde 
 
Although considered somewhat passe in the recherche circles of 
jurisprudential scholarship, H.L.A. Hart's view of law as basically a rule-
applying activity remains the guiding theme of many legal practitioners and 
doctrinal scholars. The fact that his writings are no longer thought of as 
innovative or exceptional is only testament to their pervasive acceptance as part 
and parcel of what it is to be and think like a lawyer. Of course, this should 
not be surprising. His work was informed by the Austin -Wittgenstein 
imperative that good philosophy was simply making sense of people's daily 
linguistic practices: The Concept of Law was offered as 'an essay in 
descriptive sociology.' 1 As such, his juristic studies recommended themselves 
to the practical mind of the common lawyer; there was an intuitive and 
reassuring fit between what lawyers thought they were doing and what they 
were told that they should be doing. The fact that Bart's uncluttered writings 
also justified and set to rest any qualms about the legitimacy of lawyers' and 
judges' roles in a liberal democracy also helped. Showcased by the elegant 
simplicity of his writing, Hart's elevation of legal common sense to the status of 
jurisprudential theory is both his greatest strength and his greatest weakness. 2 
Over thirty years after the publication of his majestic monograph, Hart has 
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posthumously rejoined the debate over the nature of law and adjudication. In a new 
and previously unpublished Postscript, incorporated in a second edition, Hart 
responds to some of his old adversaries, like Lon L. Fuller, Ronald Dworkin and 
John Finnis. In the process he adds a new spark to the debate and stokes the flame 
of analytical jurisprudence. While the differences between their positions and his 
own are important Hart contends that they are not as great or significant as many 
have come to believe. With characteristic equanimity and balance, Hart maintains 
that, shorn of exaggeration and caricature, there is much to recommend his 
adversaries: the problem lies not so much in their basic tenets, but in their 
hegemonic tendencies. Nevertheless, the postscript is a posthumous and 
unequivocal affirmation of Hart's own special brand of analytical jurisprudence 
that law and morality are best kept separate; that rules are the heart and soul of the 
legal process; and that adjudication has an inescapable element of choice. 3 
This essay proceeds on the raison d 'etre that the past and its heroes are better 
respected through active engagement than through passive veneration. I want to 
put a revived Hart to work in the hectic world of contemporary concerns rather 
than leave him to be admired as an historical curiosity in the jurisprudential Hall of 
Fame. Such an undertaking can illuminate a very different Hart from the one 
caricatured in contemporary legal literature. Rather than be the country bumpkin 
to contemporary theory's urbane sages, he appears as a much more prescient and 
balanced theorist. To do this, I offer a postmodern reading of Hart; it is more a 
review than a review. By this, I do not mean that I will attempt to demonstrate 
that Hart was really a postmodernist at heart (although such a challenge is 
tempting). Instead, I will read Hart from an avowedly postmodern perspective -
the fact that some of my conclusions may not be seen lo fit snugly with those 
that many think are crucial to the Hartian canon is beside the point. 
The critical focus of this postmodern rendition is the always topical and 
perennially contested notion of what it means to take rules seriously. Working with 
Hart's mature theory, I will follow through, more fully than he did, on his primary 
insight that legal language is a social activity that depends on convention and 
context for meaning. As convention and context are never historically stable and 
always socially contestable, I argue that the meaning and application of legal rules 
cannot be put beyond the possibility of disputation or the need for defence. In 
defending this view of law as an incorrigibly indeterminate exercise, I will not take 
Hart's theory lightly, but actually take more seriously than he did his remark that 
'rules cannot provide for their own application, and even in the clearest case a 
human being must apply them. '4 And this is no bad democratic thing. In a society 
that aspires to more popular involvement and less elite control, rules are taken 
most seriously when they are treated most sceptically. Consequently, by pursuing 
this postmodern commitment, I will be better able to defend a Hartian-inspired 
sceptical thesis against the contending triad of contemporary jurisprudential 
approaches the arch-positivists, the neo-naturalists and the so-called nihilists. 
This article is divided into three main sections. In the first, I locate Hart's 
positivistic account of adjudication within the configurations of contemporary 
jurisprudential debate that Hart's writings themselves helped to establish. The 
second section has a threefold structure: the first part unearths the linguistic 
footings of Ordinary Language philosophy on which Hart built his juristic edifice; 
the second shifts the critical emphasis from Hart's concern with 'textual 
ambiguity' to a more radical exposure of law's 'structural indeterminacy'; and the 
third gives a more practical rendering of that theoretical critique. In the third 
section, I play out the implications of this shift for the resolution of easy cases and 
for the practice of a sceptical judging. Finally, in a short conclusion, I draw 
together the strands of the sceptical argument and consider their combined effect 
on contemporary legal theorising. Throughout, I use Hart's famous example of the 
rule that 'no vehicles may be taken into the park' 5 to illustrate and test the force 
of Hart's and my own general claims. 
 
The Hart of the matter 
Throughout Hart's diverse oeuvre, the connecting thread is his positivistic 
insistence that law and morality are best kept separate if the study of either is to 
be profitable and instructive. He has played a leading role in the three major 
debates in jurisprudence over the last fifty years. 6 I intend to concentrate on 
the third of these exchanges about the nature of adjudication and, in particular, 
the operation and limits of rule application as a method of legal decision-
making how is it possible to get beyond a discredited formalism without 
turning judging into an open-ended exercise in ideological wrangling? Hart's 
prominence in this debate is ironic in that he later concluded that he said 
'far too little about the topic of adjudication and legal reasoning. '7 Indeed, 
the main thrust of his work is to present a more sophisticated theory of 
positivism than had hitherto been available and in which an explanation of 
adjudication would only be a small part. As such, The Concept of Law captures 
a special kind of positivism; the fact that it is now considered the positivistic 
account of law should not blind contemporary readers to its original novelty and 
controversiality. As well as believing that there are no noncontingent 
connections between Jaw and morality, Hart crafted a style of legal 
positivism that was more normative in content than Austin's and more pluralist 
in scope than Bentham's. 8 However, rather than range broadly across the 
whole Hartian positivistic terrain, I will only touch upon such general 
themes as they relate specifically to adjudication and rule application. 
Moreover, in light of the widespread familiarity with Hart's work, my initial 
introduction will be brief and to the sceptical point. 
 
A good night's sleep 
Hart's concern is not with the internal perspective of how and why lawyers 
(and citizens) do what they do in particular legal cultures, but that of an 
external observer of law and legal systems generally. However, while 
theorists need not endorse the viewpoint of participants in the system to 
be understood, he does recognise that it is essential that theorists record the 
participants' normative views and commitments: 'description may still be 
description, even when what is described is an evaluation. '9 As such, 
although his theoretical stance is resolutely external, Hart's positivism is of a 
soft variety. He does not maintain that the truth of legal propositions is 
reducible to bare historical facts, but acknowledges that values can be fully 
implicated: 'the existence and content of law can be identified by reference to 
the social sources of law . . . without reference to morality except where the 
law thus identified has itself incorporated moral criteria for the 
identification of law. '10 Within these positivistic parameters, Hart depicts law 
as a functional and sophisticated system of rules the obligation-imposing 
primary rules that comprise the bulk of substantive legal doctrine, like 
criminal and contract law, and the authority-conferring secondary rules that 
distribute institutional power and jurisdiction, between legislatures and courts 
for example, over the creation and enforcement of the primary rules. In both 
cases, in keeping with his general theoretical perspective, Hart insisted that 
rules had to be distinguished from merely observable regularities of behaviour. 
For participants in the system, rules operate 'as the basis for claims, demands, 
admissions, criticism or punishment' and 'the violation of a rule is not merely a 
basis for the prediction that a hostile reaction will follow but as reason for 
hostility.' 11 Without reference to this internal attitude that lawyers and citizens 
exhibit towards rules, a vital element of jurisprudential understanding would 
be lost. In the Hartian scheme of things, therefore, a cogent explanation of 
legal obligation is as much about attitude and acceptance as it is about fate 
and fiat. 
Against this analytical backdrop, Hart developed a suggestive account of 
adjudication; it was a description of what occurs, not a prescription for what 
might or should occur. In typical fashion, he made a virtue of compromise. 
Presenting a reasoned and reasonable account of modern judging, he 
unashamedly sought to inhabit a middle-ground between formalist pitfalls and 
realist excesses: 'legal theory . . . is apt either to ignore or to exaggerate the 
indeterminacies of legal rules.' 12 Almost all commentators accepted that the 
realist account of adjudication 
'that judges always make and never find the law' was a nightmare to be 
avoided. Instead, debate was joined over the extent to which the noble dream 
of a formalist faith 'that Uudges] never make it' could be revived and 
revised. Throughout his contribution, Hart accepted that, while these 
'illusions . . . have much of value to teach the jurist in his waking hours,' 13 
the sensible lawyer will settle for a good night's sleep. He wanted to 
ensure that legal theory would abandon some of its more recent nocturnal 
fantasies so that legal practice would be able to get on with its day job in a 
refreshed and undistracted way. · 
Hart's patented jurisprudential formula for a legal good night's sleep is 
prosaic and pragmatic. While not claiming to offer a full-blown theory of 
adjudication, he considered rule application to be at the heart of the judicial 
task. Empowered to apply rules in order to resolve disputes between 
conflicting citizens, the hallmark of 'good' judges is their ability to identify 
the extant rules of the legal system and apply them to concrete situations. 
Nonetheless, this craft is not a purely technical or logical exercise. In a 
famous phrase, Hart argued that law has an 'open texture. "4 Because law, like 
language, is an entirely conventional affair and convention is neither gapless 
nor precise, this system of rules cannot be complete or comprehensive: some 
cases, therefore, will be 'not merely . . . controversial in the sense that 
reasonable and informed lawyers may disagree about which answer is legally 
correct, but the law is fundamentally incomplete' (p 252). Consequently, these 
so-called 'hard cases' will invoke and require non-conventional decisionmaking 
processes. In fulfilling their duties, judges have to call on a variety of 
analytical skills and reasoning techniques: they act inductively when they 
extract rules from a line of past cases; they act deductively when they apply 
the inductively-extracted rule to the case in point; and they act politically 
when the inductively-extracted rule or its deductive application is uncertain or 
difficult. In this unpretentious account of judging, indeterminacy is something 
that pervades the judicial task, but it is always relative, marginal and not to 
be exaggerated. Accordingly, Hartian judges are not mindless automatons, 
Delphic oracles, wellmeaning simpletons, rampant legislators or cynical 
manipulators; they struggle to do justice in a way that respects rules without 
becoming enslaved to them. To the chagrin of the dogmatist and the true 
believer, they are 'men [and women], not gods' nor, it might be added, 
beasts. 15 
The first stage of Hartian adjudication is the inductive extraction of the 
appropriate rule; this is the precedential soul of the common law. Although 
there are 'a vast number of determinate rules' and this exercise will be 
productive of 'very little doubt,' Hart concedes that 'any honest description' 
will recognise considerable leeway for judicial involvement. 16 Consequently, 
even at this first stage, indeterminacy is a characteristic feature of the 
adjudicative process -there is no one correct or authoritative method for 
determining the relevant precedent from among the many competing lines of 
cases, the rule for which a particular precedent stands, the precise verbal 
formulation of that rule, or the exceptions to that rule. 
Having formulated the relevant rule (and its exceptions) with sufficient 
precision, the judge must then set about applying that rule to the facts of the 
case. This is the dynamic hub of the judicial undertaking. Neither absolute 
faith in the dispositive force of rules nor arbitrary disregard of them are part 
of the Hartian dialectic. While rule application is not a purely mechanical or 
logical operation, a genuine commitment to its consistent practice means that 
'human conduct is made in some sense non-optional or obligatory. '17 To apply a 
rule is not to make routine recourse to the consequences that attend such an 
application. Whenever one regularly does so, it undermines the practice and 
legitimacy of rule application generally: the judge ceases to be engaged in rule 
application, but is instead making a post hoc resort to the rule as a justification 
for a particular consequence which is compatible with the rule and which is not 
offensive as a matter of justice. For Hart, although an attention to consequences 
may be required in some cases, this is better done openly rather than under the 
pretence of rule application: 
None the less, the life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of 
officials and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of 
variable standards, do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case. This salient fact 
of social life remains true, even though uncertainties may break out as to the applicability of any 
rule (whether written or communicated by precedent) to a concrete case. Here at the margin of 
rules and in the fields left open by the theory of precedents, the courts perform a rule-producing 
elaboration of variable standards. 18 
While the parameters and sources of this rule-producing responsibility have 
varied across the Hartian canon, his mature advice was that this power to 
legislate interstitially is not to be performed in a vacuum or done in an 
arbitrary or ideological way. When legal rules fail or run out, judges are not 
somehow out on their own but are subject to 'a wide variety of individual and 
social interests, social and political aims, and standards of morality and 
justice' 19 that are encompassed in the working norms of legal doctrine. 
Indeed, it is the development and refinement of these 'criteria of relevance 
and closeness of resemblance . . . [that] characterise whatever is specific or 
peculiar in legal reasoning. '20 While there is no uniquely correct result, 
judicial choice is a rational and constrained process in which 'many decisions 
can be clearly ruled out as incorrect' 21 and in which the failure to ensure real 
or idealised unanimity among judges is not fatal. 
In the most important part of The Concept of Law' s new postscript, Hart 
accepts that Dworkinesque principles are indeed part of the law, but denies 
that there is any sharp contrast between non-conclusive principles and all-or-
nothing rules: 'the distinction is a matter of degree. '22 However, Hart does 
not believe that positivism is devastated by this concession because, when 
properly understood, a legal system's ultimate criteria of legal validity the 
rule of recognition can easily and legitimately accommodate moral values. 
That having been said, he insists that there is little to distinguish Dworkin's 
holistic interpretive criterion of legal integrity from his own recommended 
judicial way of proceeding. Judges must still offer general justificatory 
reasons for their decisions and, often proceeding by analogy, 'ensure that the 
new law they make, though it is new law, is in accordance with principles or 
underpinning reasons recognised as already having footing in the existing 
law. '23 Nevertheless, even the most Herculean of judges will occasionally 
have to fall back on their own moral instincts and political beliefs: 
Though this procedure certainly defers, it does not eliminate the moment for judicial 
lawmaking, since in any hard case different principles supporting competing analogies may 
present themselves and a judge will often have to choose between them, relying, like a 
conscientious legislator, on his sense of what is best and not on any already established order of 
priorities prescribed for him by law.24 
While Hartian judges might become adept at the independent crafts of rule 
application and rule production, the acid test of the truly gifted Hartian 
judges is their astuteness of knowing when to move from rule application to 
rule production. While this does not lend itself to formulaic instruction or 
structured learning, Hart does rely on the heuristic distinction between 'clear 
cases' and 'hard cases' to guide the perplexed judge through this critical maze 
and to maintain some chance of a good night's sleep. However, this instruction 
is somewhat empty as he admits that it is a matter of considerable difficulty 
to provide an exhaustive account of what makes a 'clear case' clear and what 
makes a 'hard case' hard. Nevertheless, he observes, somewhat tautologically, 
that clear cases are those occasions on which there is general agreement and 
very little doubt that the facts in issue obviously fall within the meaning and 
scope of a rule. Hard cases, therefore, must be those cases in which such 
general agreement is lacking and there are real doubts about the applicability of 
a rule. As with nearly all of Hart's work, the distinction is not so much a matter 
of conceptual analysis, but an observed fact about the empirical behaviour of 
judges and the functional operation of language: 
Even when verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties as to the form of 
behaviour required by them may break out in particular concrete cases. Particular fact 
situations do not await us already marked off from each other and labelled as instances of the 
general rule, the application of which is in question; nor can the rule itself step forward to 
claim its own instances. In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, 
inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide. 
There will indeed be plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general 
expressions are clearly applicable ('If anything is a vehicle a motor car is one'), but there will 
also be cases where it is not clear whether they apply or not. ('Does "vehicle" used here 
include bicycles, airplanes, roller skates?')25 
Again, however, Hart has not been entirely consistent about the empirical 
distribution of these clear and hard cases or, therefore, about the extent to which 
judicial choice is present and unavoidable. While he began with the opinion in 
1958 that 'how rare . . . [and] how exceptional is this feeling that one way of 
deciding a case is imposed upon us as the only natural or rational elaboration of 
some rule' and that the language of choice 'better conveys the realities of the 
situation,' he appears to have repudiated that view by 1983 and settled on the 
conclusion that the standard resort to rule application occurred 'very often' and 
was the primary device for legitimate adjudication. 26 It seems to follow, 
therefore, that while Hart contends that 'a margin of uncertainty should be 
tolerated and indeed welcomed, '27 he is also confirming that, for the positivist 
claim to hold true, there must be an operational degree of certainty. This 
conclusion seems vital if Hart is to maintain the integrity and validity of his 
accounts of law generally and judging in particular. Without a critical mass of 
standard meanings and settled rules, the very idea that rules would control judicial 
decisions, that there exists an actual body of workable rules, that such rul/es would 
command authoritative conformity, that judging is something less than legislative 
policy-making, and that there is some meaningful distinction between the law as 
it is and the law as it ought to be, would all be lost. For Hart, therefore, while 
legal theory and training will understandably be occupied with the penumbra, 
'preoccupation with the penumbra is . . . as rich a source of confusion . . . as 
[preoccupation with] formalism. '28 
Of course, the fact that rules are not always dispositive of cases or that there 
is considerable scope for judicial choice and innovation is not presented by Hart 
as a matter of genuine concern. Indeed, he welcomes the fact that there is an 
inevitable and relative indeterminacy or open texture in the law: the loss of 
complete certainty and predictability is the price that has to be paid for the law 
being flexible enough to handle unanticipated cases in a fair and just manner. 
The challenge for both the judge and jurist is to strike an appropriate and 
manageable balance between the rule application of clear cases and the rule 
production of hard cases such that certainty is not sacrificed entirely to 
particularised flexibility. On this issue, Hart is adamant that, if clear cases did 
not comprise the bulk of adjudicated decisions, 'we should not attach 
significance and value to them or think of such decisions as reached 
through a rational process. '
29
 Accordingly, Hart's writings present judging 
as a balanced and judicious affair it is rational without being scientific, 
flexible without being unbounded, judgmental without being arbitrary and 
predictable without being predetermined. 
 
Rude awakenings 
In the thirty years since the original publication of The Concept of Law, the 
focus of jurisprudential attention has become (trans)fixed on the adjudicative 
function; what was once merely a small part of the juristic project has become 
its almost total concern. While Hart's ideas are no longer thought to be 
entirely pertinent to the contemporary agenda of pressing issues, legal 
theorists have not so much rejected Hart's rule-based positivistic account of 
adjudication as tried to qualify it in various ways. Taking a leaf from the 
litigator's notebook, they have tried to both confess (rules are important in 
law) and avoid (rules are not exhaustive of law) the force of Hart's claims. 
Critics and defenders alike have retained Hartian positivism's central article of 
faith namely, that rules are the basic currency of legal transactions and that 
they have a core meaning that can deal with and resolve most situations. Even 
the most anti-positivistic jurist, like Dworkin, accepts that there are frequent 
occasions on which a rule 'applies itself 30 and even the most pragmatic 
theorist, like Posner, embraces the idea that the skill to apply rules in a 
creative way and to make that application persuasive to others is the hallmark 
of the good lawyer and judge. 31 However, the efforts to qualify and distinguish 
Hart have not been trivial. They can be grouped into two main trends a 
naturalist resurgence and a positivistic retrenchment. 
The great majority of jurists has sought to envelop an understanding of law 
and adjudication in a larger and more expansive moral universe. Although 
Hart was accurate in observing that rules were open-textured and their 
application did not exhaust the judicial function, these neo-naturalist jurists 
argue that he failed to appreciate the extent to which the law consists of 
more than rules. Behind and within the rules is a political morality that guides 
and constrains judges when the application of rules was unclear or undesirable. 
Law was about values and politics, but not in any idiosyncratic or ideological 
way. The primary task of theorists and judges is to detect and cultivate the 
politico-moral principles that breathe life into the dry bones oflegal rules. For 
some, the legal process is a subtle economic game in which the invisible hand 
of the market shapes and wields legal rules in the best approximation of wealth 
maximisation; for others, legal doctrine is a morality play in which individual 
rights struggle with collective interests over the soul of constitutional justice; 
and for still others, the courts represent a privileged site for a continuing civic 
dialogue over the possibilities and parameters of democratic governance. 32 
A smaller group of jurisprudential scholars has maintained that Hart fudged 
on the moral basis of law. Agreeing that Hart's attempt at compromise was 
not a triumph, but a sell-out, they concluded that Hart was a radical in 
traditionalist's clothing who had reneged on the democratic compact by letting 
the political cat out of the legal bag. However, rather than salvage the legal 
enterprise by mixing in more morality, these arch-positivists seek to redeem 
the democratic legitimacy of law by purifying it of any moral entanglements. 
Such a hard variety of positivism treats law exclusively as a matter of social 
fact and not a moral ideal. 33 While not everything judges say or do is law, 
their application of legal rules not only can but must be free of moralising; to 
do more (or less) would be improper, unjudicial and undemocratic. This is not 
so much an amoral stance as a moral position that defends a legalism of 
strictly rule-bound adjudication as the most morallydefensible account of law 
and adjudication in a constitutional democracy. It is a vision of judging that 
celebrates the systemic virtues of regularity, predictability and certainty over 
the concern with substantive justice in particular instances. In one of its most 
uncompromising incarnations, Justice Scalia insists that '[t]here are times 
when even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.'34 
In spite of their obvious differences, these conflicting naturalist and 
positivist trends are united in their shared and enduring formalistic belief that 
there must be a clear and defensible line between valid adjudication and 
ideological disputation. Both maintain that legal reasoning is a 
sufficiently detached and determinate enterprise that can generate correct 
and predictable answers to social disputes in a way that marks it off, in a 
non-trivial and meaningful way, from open-ended political wrangling. 
While immersed in politics and history, law is its own thing and not entirely 
reducible to anything else. Without such a possibility, the fear is that the 
Rule of Law will be subverted and democratic governance will succumb to 
the tyranny of special interest groups. Moreover, without adequate 
determinacy in legal discourse, judicial arbitrariness will become the order 
of the day and adjudication will collapse into a series of ad hoc and 
unprincipled encounters. Accordingly, positivists and naturalists agree that 
the preservation of the Rule of Law 'has the value of promising to make 
politics safe, of preventing Leviathan from becoming Frankenstein's 
monster . . . [of imposing] real restraints on arbitrariness or despotic 
conduct. '35 
The important question for both the positivist and the naturalist account is 
not whether law in large part can be represented as the application of clear 
rules wrapped up in intelligible doctrine, but whether it ever can be so. It is my 
sceptical contention that it cannot. Supported by a postmodern reading of 
Hart, I resist the claim that there is an abiding core meaning to rules that can 
be located and relied upon in applying them. While there is always a topical 
distinction between the core of a rule's meaning and its penumbral 
uncertainty at any particular moment, this relation between core and penumbra 
is contingent and cannot provide the stability and fixity that its proponents 
suggest and require; yesterday's penumbra is today's core which will be 
tomorrow's penumbra. People bring different experiences to rules and, 
therefore, interpret and follow them differently: there is no uniformity of 
experience and, therefore, no uniform experience of what it is to follow a 
rule. Any claim that judges are only held back from a frenzy of arbitrariness 
by the restraining power of rules is not only unrealistic, but also does scant 
credit to the integrity and efforts of most judges. 
In the process of explicating what a postmodern application of rules entails, 
I will defend my version of rule scepticism against the exaggerated claims 
of the third strain in contemporary jurisprudential criticism -the so-called 
nihilists. This disaffected small group has let their critical zeal overcome their 
intellectual insight. They have pursued an extreme line of hyper-sceptical 
argument which has exacerbated the formalist fear that, without some 
plausible account of determinate rule following, there will be an official 
anarchy .in which rules will count for nothing or simply be used as ex post 
rationalisations for ex ante decisions. For instance, Tushnet concedes too 
much when he states that if he were appointed to the bench he would adopt a 
'currently fashionable theory' of adjudication and then use it to advance the 
cause of socialism or whatever. 36 This fails to take the legal enterprise 
seriously and offers no real challenge to its theoretical legitimacy. After all, as 
Hart insists, the judges' experience of actually applying rules must be 
incorporated into and explained by any cogent account of adjudication. 
Moreover, a nihilistic perspective persists in the error that judges can step out 
of themselves and adopt some view from a legal nowhere. In contrast, I 
contend that the judges are both more and less constrained by rules than any 
of the positivists, naturalists and nihilists think. They are more constrained in 
the sense that they cannot land completely outside of rules and exercise an 
entirely free choice, but they are less constrained in the sense that they are not 
obliged to reach any particular decision as the result of a commitment to 
resolve disputes through rule application. 
Contrary to a nihilist perspective, therefore, I maintain that nothing is lost 
to the radical critic (and everything is to be gained) by taking the legal 
enterprise seriously. Of course, this is provided that taking law and 
adjudication seriously means doing so in a postmodern way. It is not so 
much that rules do not exist, but that they do not exist as canonical directives 
whose meaning is available without interpretation and which can 
impersonally dispose of cases. The meaning of a rule and its application 
never simply is it is something to be argued for or with and not something to 
be argued from. As conventional and social matters, the meaning and 
application of rules is contextual and, therefore, open. The fear of rule-free 
choice is as contrived as faith in rule-bound choice. 
In presenting a postmodern's Hart, therefore, I defend a modest and 
Hartianinspired position that is situated between the excesses of both a 
naturalist and a positivist approach on the one side, and a nihilist critique of 
law and adjudication on the other. In other words, I will articulate a critical 
account of lawyering and judging that takes rules seriously in the only way 
that they can be taken seriously as a special kind of activity or game which is 
defined by rules and roles, but in which the nature and effect of those rules 
and roles are themselves always in play. Such an account will consolidate the 
traditional rejection by positivism of the naturalists' pretension to project law 
as a seamless web of doctrinal filaments. As importantly, it will provide a 
much-needed corrective to any tendency to present rule application as nothing 
more than a transparent exercise in self-delusion.37 In the process, I will 
explain how the concession that there is widespread predictability to the legal 
and judicial process is not fatal or even embarrassing to the sceptical claim that 
the body of legal rules is radically indeterminate. When properly understood, 
the sceptical claim is not that 'anything goes,' but that 'anything might go.' 
 
From ambiguity to indeterminacy 
Hart's masterstroke was to introduce the linguistic lessons of Wittgenstein and 
his Ordinary Language colleagues to the study of law. Indeed, Hart was one of 
the first lawyers to take seriously the idea that law was a linguistic practice and that 
the jurist's task was to clarify and elucidate the social use of legal statements 
and linguistic practices. Consequently, his general jurisprudence and particular 
account of judging is driven by and given much of its intellectual shape by his 
understanding of language's role. He thus shifted the focus of jurisprudential 
attention away from philosophical abstractions toward a more practical view of 
law-as-social-activity. In the Hartian canon, law was not a heavenly body but had 
feet of clay. However, in importing Wittgenstein's ideas to jurisprudence, Hart got 
more than be bargained for. Intended as mild correctives to a tendency in 
jurisprudence to abstraction, the notions of convention and context are a strong 
form of theoretical purgative. Although Hart strives to confine their effects, such 
debilitating ideas are fatal to many of the basic concepts upon which Hart builds 
his theory of law. 
 
A weak Hart 
Until the late nineteenth century, language had generally been taken for granted. 
Treated as a transparent medium through which, if used properly, the light of 
meaning shone, it had eluded sustained or searching critique. Philosophers tended 
to proceed as if words were incorporeal elements that existed in an abstract realm 
whose unique meaning had to be revealed and refined. However, the advent of the 
'linguistic turn' in philosophy brought an end to such naivety. While this concern 
with language took many forms and directions, the most important for English 
jurisprudence and Hart's positivism was the so-called Ordinary Language School 
of Philosophy which drew its intellectual inspiration from the later writings of 
Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein, many of philosophy's problems had been verbal 
and self-imposed because theorists insisted on taking words out of their context 
and separating them from their function: 'philosophical problems arise when 
language goes on holiday. '38 Abandoning the idea that language had an enduring 
relation to the world and that words' meanings were simply pictures of that 
world, his major insight was that language was a human activity and that words 
served different needs in different ways at different times. Accordingly, 
meaning was to be understood through the word's function and the rules which 
° 
governed its use. 
By way of the work of J.L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle,39 Hart set out to introduce 
this bracing linguistic scepticism into the staid corner of juristic deliberation. In 
his inaugural Oxford lecture in 1953, he cast grave doubts on the adequacy 
and validity of attempts to supply a traditional definition per genus et 
differentiam of law and basic legal conceptions: it was not possible to provide a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the use and meaning of a word. 
Instead, he emphasised that such words as 'law' and 'right' do not stand for 
any abstract entities or describe any pre-existing factual reality. 4 For Hart, the 
relation between legal words and the world was neither straightforward nor 
mirror-like. The adequacy oflegal definitions is not to be found in their 
correctness, but in their usefulness to achieve the particular aim in question. As 
such, the point of The Concept of Law was 'to advance legal theory by providing 
an improved analysis of the distinctive structure of a municipal legal system and 
a better understanding of the resemblances and differences between law, 
coercion and morality, as types of social phenomena. '41 Accordingly, Hart is 
anti-reductionist in that he views legal terms as irreducible to hon-legal 
language or some non-linguistic reality; Hartian jurisprudence is, therefore, 
touted to be as much about sociology as philosophy and as much about 
convention as universality. 
Beginning from such a language-centred premise, Hart was persuaded that 
jurisprudence should consist of attempts to elucidate the underlying and 
recurrent themes of legal thinking through exposing the multitude of legal 
shadows and ambiguities in habitual legal usage. This approach did not do away 
with definitions entirely, but recommended a much less abstract and more 
contextual analysis of legal language: definitions were to be general 
approximations rather than final explanations and could not be used as 
incontrovertible postulates from which conclusive axioms could be logically 
inferred. Consequently, words like 'rule,' 'right' and 'legal person' could not be 
defined by pointing to corresponding things or actions in the external world, but 
could only be understood in terms of their legal function and social usage. 
Hart urged that certain ground rules could be drafted and observed in giving 
meaning to legal constructs: first, put them into the context of the whole sentence; 
next, specify the conditions under which the whole sentence is true; and then, 
show how that sentence is used in drawing a conclusion from the rules in a 
particular case. 
Nevertheless, the social factness of law will confound efforts to construct a 
scientifically precise or purely abstract account of law. As a conventional 
linguistic practice, law shares the imprecision and messiness of social life. 
While there are better and worse ways to participate in and practice legal 
language, there is no perfectible use of legal language. Any attempt to fix the 
meaning of particular words will be defeated by people's 'relative ignorance 
of fact . . . [and] relative indeterminacy of aim. '42 For Hart, people's inability to 
predict or anticipate the future with confidence ensures that the struggle to 
communicate in a clear and unambiguous manner is hubristic and, as such, is 
doomed to failure: 'uncertainty at the borderline is the price to be paid for the 
use of general classifying terms in any form of communication concerning 
matters of fact. '43 Within the Hartian view of law, philosophical clarity is 
bought at the price of practical uncertainty, and social determinacy at the 
expense of theoretical legitimacy. However, while words must be understood 
in their linguistic context and lack any absolutely determinate meaning, Hart 
maintained that words do have a core of settled meaning; there are some 
standard instances which guide their use. Without this sense that a particular 
string of words 'fixes necessary conditions which anything must satisfy if it 
is to be within the scope and certain clear examples of what is certainly 
within its scope may be present to our minds, '44 communication would not 
be possible. However, in Hart's view, outside their core of settled meaning or 
standard instances, general statements will have a penumbra of indeterminacy, 
a fuzzy border in which the bewildering interaction of wordly flux and human 
ingenuity will confound attempts to give words sharp and clear-cut edges. In 
such peripheral regions of uncertainty, general agreement in judgments about 
meaning will have to be reached actively rather than simply recognised: 
the classifier must make a decision which is not dictated to him, for the facts and phenomena to 
which we fit our words and apply our rules are as it were dumb. Fact situations do not await 
us neatly labelled, creased and folded, nor is their legal classification written on them to be 
simply read off by the judge. Instead, in applying legal rules, someone must take the 
responsibility of deciding that words do or do not cover some case in hand with all the 
practical consequences involved in this decision.45 
However innovative and different Hart's resort to the themes of 
Wittgensteinian linguistic analysis appeared in the 1950s and 1960s to the 
Anglo-American jurisprudential establishment, it was characteristically 
cautious and considereo. In his inaugural lecture itself and later in The 
Concept of Law, Hart hedged on the importance and implications of context 
and function for linguistic analysis: they were more like helpful accessories 
than fundamental tools for moving beyond a strictly 'representational' 
understanding of language. For instance, although he argued that legal terms 
are not used 'to stand for or describe anything,' they 'do not have the 
straightforward connection with counterparts in the world of facts which most 
ordinary words have and to which we appeal in our definition of ordinary 
words. '46 Hart seems to think that the dependence of meaning on function 
and context is a pecularity of formal systems of language, such as law and 
games: law is an anomalous mode of expression. In view of this, he is fond 
of talking about the 'natural expression' of certain concepts and points of 
view as though their meaning was fixed and determinate across and among 
different contexts. 47 He fails to appreciate that the contextual and functional 
insight is as salient to the operation of the vast number of informal and 
overlapping practices that comprise language as a whole. Moreover, without 
such an acknowledgement, Hart's commitment to a truly functional and 
contextual understanding of language is seriously attenuated and fatally 
compromised. In so far as the content of Hart's use-based rules and rights draw 
upon and connect to 'ordinary language,' the resort to context and function is 
rendered marginal and insignificant. 
This debilitating tendency is reinforced by Hart's indication of what it 
means to take a contextual approach to legal language. His treatment of 
sentences as the prime unit of meaning rather than as a series of isolated words 
was only a first step. Hart went no further in his embrace of a contextual 
analysis than to suggest that it was possible to attach meaning to legal 
constructs by putting them in their larger grammatical context and by 
recognising 'the cardinal principle that legal words can only be elucidated by 
considering the conditions under which statements in which they have their 
characteristic use are true. '48 This is little more than a cursory nod in the 
direction of social usage; Hart remains indebted to a representational 
understanding of language. He most certainly does not escape the 'picture' 
theory of language, but only extends its range of brushes and palette of 
colours. In so restricting contextual analysis, Hart comes almost as close to 
talking about the truth conditions for linguistic application as those traditional 
linguistic theories from which Wittgenstein was at pains to distinguish his own 
work.49 Indeed, while Hart dresses his theory in the fashionable 
Wittgensteinian trappings of social context and conventional usage, it is in its 
essentials a traditional and objectifying body of ideas. Static, technical and 
ahistorical in its understanding of social convention, The Concept of Law 
lacks any appreciation of social life as dynamic and contingent. 
For instance, Hart seems to believe that, at least as a metaphysical 
possibility, language is capable of being unambiguous, provided that 
sufficient information could be generated to overcome 'relative ignorance of 
fact . . . [and] relative indeterminacy of aim. '50 There would be a transparency 
between the words used to express speakers' intentions and the world 
described by those words such that hearers could not be confused or unsure in 
their understanding. In leaving open the possibility of such metaphysical 
perfectibility, Hart does not live up to the sceptical expectations that his 
Wittgenstein dalliance raises and encourages; The Concept of Law is a well-
intended but unsuccessful attempt to contain the subversive implications of a 
thoroughly contextual and sceptical approach to law and language. Not only 
does Hart fudge important questions about the historical and political 
dynamism of language, he fails to understand that language is not only 
textually ambiguous but is structurally indeterminate. Because 'a context, 
always, remains open, thus fallible and insufficient, '51 context cannot do the 
explanatory and justificatory work that Hart and others ask of it. As much as 
context enables the possibility of any meaning at all, it disables the possibility 
of a fixed or settled meaning. 
Consequently, the next part of this section follows through on the sceptical 
process that Wittgenstein began (but did not finish) of unburdening language 
of its lingering metaphysical baggage and that Hart began (but did not finish) 
of flushing out law's epistemological pretensions. My critique begins, not ends, 
with the claim that meaning is ambiguous and multiple. From there, it goes 
on to make a much more challenging set of claims about language and, 
therefore, law's attachment to rule application. The thrust of an 
uncompromising sceptical critique is to ensure that rules are never the basis 
of agreements, but that agreements are always the basis of rules. 
 
A strong scepticism 
Central to the resort to linguistic analysis was the possibility that it might 
utilise language to plumb the epistemic depths of reality and necessity; 
Aristotelian 'things' and Kantian 'minds' had not proved equal to the task. 
The basic gamble was that philosophical problems could be resolved, or at 
least eased, by taking language and its everyday use more seriously. 
However, contrary to what Wittgenstein proclaimed, this endeavour only 
demonstrated that language was as likely to bewitch our intelligence as 
philosophy or anything else.52 There is no literal language one that is 
representational rather than constitutive against which other languages, such 
as law, can be contrasted. The study of language is not the last, best hope of 
philosophy, at least as traditionally understood, because it is itself shot 
through with all the contradictions and conundrums that philosophy strives 
to resolve: it is a case of out of the philosophical frying pan and into the 
linguistic microwave. If philosophy has any particular mission or ambition 
(and I doubt that it has), it is not to isolate Truth or confirm The Way Things 
Really Are, but to challenge old shibboleths and generate new and interesting 
truths that better serve humanity's efforts to improve itself. 
An old philosophical gloss does much to prick the balloon of 
philosophical conceit and to highlight the way that language does (and does 
not) work: 'to do is to be' Sartre; 'to be is to do' Nietzsche; and 'do be do 
be do' Frank Sinatra. Both the point and the recitation of this gloss, 
illustrating that language is very much a practice unto itself, contradicts the 
claims and assumptions of many epistemologists. In particular, it highlights 
traditional philosophy's failure to grasp fully the implications of the critical 
idea that there might not be a transparency between the signifier and that to 
be signified -there may be all kinds of contextual forces in play that 
intervene. Discursive usage and practice are not the positivistic foundations 
that Hart and others claim them to be; they are riddled with political and 
social cracks. Language is not something that is a mirror or window to reality, 
but is always part of that reality: language is constitutive rather than 
designative. The relation of mind, language and things is not about causal 
necessity but about functional adequacy. This is as much a matter of 
prescriptive fit as descriptive accuracy. 
Reality cannot be known outside of the discourse through which it is 
apprehended. In a post-Kuhnian world, there are no theory-independent facts 
or, what Wittgenstein termed, 'superlative fact(s)'53 that comprise an 
unambiguous starting point for philosophical analysis; there is no object of 
inquiry outside a context of inquiry. This insight is doubly valid for language 
and law. There are no 'facts' about the way legal language works that are not 
themselves beholden to some theory about what counts as law, language and 
social facts. Of course, this is not to subscribe to the absurdly idealistic view 
that there is no world which functions outside of language and that reality is 
'begot of nothing but vain fantasy/ Which is as thin of substance as the air/ 
And more inconstant than the wind. '54 I argue that, beyond immediate and 
personal sensations of the physical environment, the world is only accessible 
and knowable through language; life is an interpretive activity. While 
communicative practices are not the only kind of practices, they do frame and 
give meaning to other practices and are important for that reason. 
Consequently, Hart's insistence that the meaning of certain words, like 
'vehicle,' is somehow a fact, that its definition simply is and its authority is 
self-evident, is not tenable: language and meaning are always hostage to their 
historical and theoretical context. 
Understanding language, therefore, is not about abstract reflection, but it is 
about social activity. The key relation is between speakers rather than 
between words and things: 'if language is to be a means of communication, 
there must be agreements not only in definitions, but also (queer as this may 
sound) in judgments' and, therefore, 'the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or a form of life. '55 For all his good intentions, Hart fails to follow 
through on this fundamental Wittgensteinian insight. He treats ordinary 
language as not only the first word, but also and this is the problem as the 
last word on its philosophical significance. Contrary to Hart's view, ambiguity 
in language is not the result of inadequate or imprecise attempts at definition, 
but is a result of the systemic and structural problem that, as meaning depends 
upon agreement, there is no sufficient or adequate common ground among 
users of the language as to what particular words mean in particular 
circumstances. The world of people and, therefore, of language is contingent; it 
never stands still long enough to reach social consensus or historical closure. 
This·view of language does not deny the possibility of meaning, but is 
fundamentally sceptical about the status and stability of any meaning reached. 
Thus, it is more easily understood that, while context manages to account for 
the operation and intelligibility of language, it simultaneously manages to 
undermine the possibility of grounding it in anything but context itself.56 
While the judgments that stand behind and within language are not always 
reflected upon, legal cases provide an occasion when they can be. Indeed, 
unlike mathematics, law is an exercise in reflective activity. 
While this sceptical approach to language rejects the notion of language as 
an exercise in representational precision, it does not obliterate or essentialise 
the distinction between discursive representation and reality, but renders it 
organically unstable and normatively volatile. This is only fitting because 
scepticism is sceptical about all things, including scepticism itself. But this 
does not mean that sceptics disbelieve everything: this is as absurd as 
suggesting that absolutists belive everything. Sceptics are sceptical about what 
to be sceptical about. They hold beliefs, but in a provisional and conditional 
way. Accordingly, to be sceptical is not to be relativistic; its notions of truths 
are pluralistic and, cutting across and within social cultures, are not reductive 
in epistemological provenance. 57 Moreover, as Hart again recognised but did 
not fully grasp, it is not possible to develop a theory of meaning from such a 
pragmatic conception of language. The ascertainment of meaning is never 
reducible to some formulaic or fixed process of abstract reflection, but is 
always susceptible to the vicissitudes of flawed and incomplete social 
practices. A sceptical or deconstructive enquiry abandons entirely a 
transcendental attachment or ambition to fix foundational conditions for 
language. Instead, its task is to expose the dynamic fluidity of those 
foundations. It is appropriately non-foundational rather than dogmatically anti-
foundational. 
Consequently, whereas language is constitutive rather than designative, 
contextual rather than abstract, and political rather than metaphysical, Hart's 
claims about the 'relative indeterminacy '58 of law, in the sense of rules being 
vague, ambiguous and competing, are misplaced. Law and language is 
thoroughly and pervasively indeterminate. Whereas ambiguity suggests a 
textural property that is capable of final resolution, indeterminacy represents a 
discursive or linguistic property that pervades the whole interpretive act so 
that any final resolution or interpretation is unavailable. Structural 
indeterminacy gives rise to a hermeneutical undecidability in the sense that 
there can be no final closure to any claim for meaning. 59 Different meanings 
are brought about by differences in context. There is no context of context in 
that there will always be disagreement about what the proper context of any 
law or rule is. Accordingly, it is the disagreement over context that creates the 
ineradicable presence of indeterminacy. Interpretation is not a matter of 
indisputable proofs that establish the term and conditions of legal language, 
but a series of rhetorical probes in a continuing conversation about and within 
legal discourse. This demands a refocusing of critical attention away from a 
Hartian preoccupation with epistemological concepts to a sceptical concern 
with social contexts. 
 
A vehicle for indeterminacy 
'Indeterminacy' is itself controversial even among those who subscribe to a 
sceptical view of law. My own understanding is not reducible to the claim 
that 'anything goes' at any time. It is most decidedly not a facile contention 
that judges or lawyers are free to do whatever they wish: it is a claim about the 
instability and undecidability of legal meanings as historical and political 
phenomena. I reject the possibility of any sovereign and unconstrained 
interpreter as I reject the possibility of any authoritative and constraining text. 
Accordingly, claims that 'the court has complete discretion to achieve any 
outcome at all' are fantastical and miss the whole point of a postmodern 
perspective. 60 There is a difference between someone who is trying to make 
sense of a particular text and generating multiple and contradictory meanings 
and someone who is not making that effort at all and is self-consciously 
grafting a gratuitous meaning onto a particular text. 61 Unlike the latter, the 
former involves a good faith account of legal interpretation in which the 
interpreter must hold a practical and actual belief that the law does permit 
such a course of action. If there is, the debate over meaning will be joined as 
one about substantive wisdom as opposed to interpretive correctness. 
However, although insistence on the endemic instability of law does not 
dictate that meaning is always elusive, it does hold that meaning's continuous 
slippage and instability does prevent the establishment of any meaning that is 
fixed and beyond further interpretative contestation. While meaning is always 
parenthetical and can never be grounded, the possibility of meaningful 
dialogue is always available: it is the theoretical status of such practical 
meaning that is debatable. Interpretation is always constrained because, without 
constraints, interpretation would not be possible. However, the constraints are 
both always in place and never themselves outside of interpretation. There is 
no politically uncontroversial or historically independent way of determining 
that interpretation  was correct or that the appropriate constraints are operative. 
As such, the indeterminacy thesis is itself indeterminate. Law is indeterminate 
not in relation to a stable social context, but because of the indeterminacy of 
that social context. It is a non-instrumental account of law because it resists the 
idea, shared by fundamentalist Marxist, feminist and Chicagoan theorists, that 
it is possible to map with any certainty the correlation between  the forces that 
give rise to concrete interpretations  of particular rules and doctrines and the 
interests that those interpretations serve.62 It must be emphasised that 
indeterminacy depends upon determinacy in that, in order to recognise  
indeterminacy,  it is important that there is a contextual backdrop  of  
determinacy  against  which  indeterminacy  can  be  identified. Accordingly, 
what is and what is not indeterminate will shift. In a manner of speaking, 
temporary and local determinacy is framed by lasting and general indeterminacy. 
Legal meaning is a simultaneous mix of the determinate and indeterminate. In 
Hartian terms, this translates into the acknowledgement that rules will be 
experienced as having a core of accepted meaning and a penumbra of 
uncertainty, but the identity of each will shift and change; what was once 
thought to be at the core will become penumbra) and vice versa. The relation 
between core and penumbra cannot be described once and for all: it is a socio-
historical artifact and cannot be reduced to a simple formula or overarching 
narrative. 63 Whether particular interpretations of a rule are or are not 
compatible is not the point. It is the fact that the question of their 
compatibility is always open and contestable. 
It takes little effort or imagination to illustrate this contingent and shifting 
relation between the core and penumbral meaning of 'vehicle.' For Hart, it is clear 
that 'if anything is a vehicle a motor car is one,' but it is equally unclear whether it 
includes 'bicycles, airplanes, roller skates. '64 Although, at any particular time in 
any particular place for any particular purpose for any particular community, this 
delineation of vehicle's core and penumbra may accurately track the prevailing 
consensus, it is difficult to sustain and defend this precise division as an enduring 
account of vehicle's meaning. Even within a particularised context, there will be 
debate and disagreement over not only whether penumbra! cases sufficiently 
resemble core instances to warrant inclusion as vehicles, but also where the line 
between core and penumbra is to be drawn does a motor car include a police 
car, ambulance or maintenance vehicle? Does it encompass a child's toy, a 
wheelchair, a child's stroller, a lawn mower or a statue of a motor car?65 
Moreover, Hart's injunction to consider words in their grammatical context is as 
likely to result in further confusion as improved clarification -does 'park' include 
an industrial estate as well as a recreational enclosure? Does it include a car park? 
An extended historical example underlines the extent to which the core and 
penumbra of words, like 'vehicle, ' shift and reconfigure in the effort to apply the 
rule 'no vehicle may be taken into the park.' In the early part of the eighteenth 
century (or before), the core and penumbra of vehicle clearly did not include motor 
cars; they were not yet invented. It was animals and animal-drawn conveyances, 
like wagons and sleds, that dominated the vehicular scene. For instance, in 1868, 
pre-car London introduced traffic controls and pedestrian crossing signals. The 
police notice warned that a manually-operated semaphore would indicate Stop or 
Caution to 'all persons in charge of vehicles and horses. '66 Indeed, as late as 1925 
in Washington, it was unclear whether the power 'to regulate vehicles on public 
streets' encompassed automobiles as they were unknown as a practical means of 
conveyance at the time of the regulation's original enactment in 1887.67 
Ironically, by 1922 in Alabama, an animal unattached to a conveyance had been 
held not to be a vehicle for the purposes of a statute authorising the confiscation of 
vehicles used for criminal activities and, by 1925 in Virginia, animal-drawn 
conveyances were not considered to be included within the ambit of vehicles. 68 
Projecting forward a few decades into the next century, it is not inconceivable that 
the motor car will have had its social day and have moved back into the penumbra! 
regions of linguistic usage: it might be replaced by an environmentally-friendly 
return to animals and animal-drawn carriages or by some futuristic means of 
transport that has only presently begun to register faintly on the present social 
consciousness. 
The point of this example is not to demonstrate that 'anything goes,' but 
that 'anything might go.' While meaning is always available, it is never 
socially stable or historically fixed; historical contingency confounds linguistic 
certainty. The settled possibility of establishing meaning at any particular time 
is always haunted by the impossibility of settling on established meaning for 
all time. My sceptical account urges, therefore, that it is entirely plausible to 
believe in indeterminacy and, at the same time, still have confidence in 
particular interpretations of particular rules at particular times in particular 
circumstances, provided that such confidence is based upon rhetorical 
cogency and not epistemological truth value. In Hartian terms, the attempt to 
define 'vehicle' is not only periodically hampered by the word or rule's textual 
ambiguity, but is permanently incapacitated by language's structural 
indeterminacy. 
In such matters it is important that the question of law's indeterminacy is 
not confused with its predictability. For instance, Greenawalt proposes, 
as a justification for his claim that the law has a workable level of 
determinacy, that 'virtually any lawyer . . . would conclude, after careful 
study, that the law provides [a particular] answer. '69 Even this modest and 
pragmatic standard is problematic and self-serving; it mistakes 
predictability for determinacy. If 'virtually any lawyer' includes those 
lawyers of a critical or deconstructive disposition, it will be extremely 
difficult to ever 'conclude, after careful study, that the law provides [any 
determinate] answer.' If such lawyers are not included, determinacy will have 
been achieved by hypothetically polling only those lawyers that already 
believe that determinacy is possible. Intended as a non-controversial and 
itself neutral standard of determinacy, Greenawalt' s proposal falls afoul 
the indeterminacy critique: it confirms rather than refutes the contingent and 
inescapable politics of law. Meaning and determinacy are not properties of 
the law itself but a function of agreement among lawyers about its relevant 
informing contexts. Indeed , as the example of a professional legal 
community confirms, many of the judgments and much of the agreement that 
Wittgenstein argues makes language work is brought about 'through 
training, drill and the forms of our life. '70 To be a lawyer is to talk like a 
lawyer and to talk like a lawyer is as much about the inculcation of social 
values and attitudes as it is about the learning of legal rules and technical 
words. 
\ 
Hart and soul 
In 1978, MacCormick felt confident enough to state that 'no one has ever 
advanced' an assault upon easy cases.71 By this he meant that there existed 
cases in which the application of the rules to the facts was beyond reasonable 
dispute; the jurisprudential action was more around the incidence, identity and 
resolution of hard cases. However, the sceptical account of law launches just 
such a full-frontal assault. It challenges the distinction between hard and easy 
cases and contends that all cases are vulnerable to sceptical disruption. Indeed, 
an uncompromising scepticism is devastating to traditional jurists' intellectual 
peace of mind because it not only disputes the naturalist claims made for the 
adjudication of hard cases, but also strikes at the hard core of the positivist 
thesis. In no uncertain terms, a sceptical account of law insists that there never 
is simply an easy fact of the legal matter; it is indeterminacy all the way down. 
The sceptical life of the law is both the indeterminate logic of its own 
contingent experience and the indeterminate experience of its own contingent 
logic. 
 
The hard core 
For Hartian positivists, the existence of easy cases is essential for a positivist 
analysis and as a justification of its jurisprudential raison d 'etre. This commitment 
flows from their basic thesis that law is a matter of social fact and that there is 
a conceptual separation between those facts and the law as it ought to be. If 
there were not easy cases, and a considerable number of them, law could 
not be considered as a social fact independent of moral considerations; it 
would be entirely a matter of judgment and an occasion for the exercise of strong 
discretion. While Hart does not claim that rule application is logical, he does 
argue that there are 'a vast number' of determinate rules whose application 
will be obvious and unproblematic in the bulk of cases.72 Although absolute 
certainty is not an achievable goal and 'a margin of uncertainty should be 
tolerated and indeed welcomed,' Hart concedes that, for the positivist claim to 
hold true, there must be an operational degree of certainty or else 'there is no 
central element of actual law to be seen in the core of settled meaning which 
rules have. m While Hart is right to point out the experience that lawyers and 
judges have of 'the core of settled meaning,' he is mistaken to treat 'the core 
of settled meaning' as a feature 'that rules have' and to consider that core or 
meaning as 'settled' in anything but the most temporary, provisional or 
contingent way. 'The core of settled meaning' is only central, settled and 
meaningful until the next roll of the hermeneutical or litigational dice. 
As Hart so compellingly shows, the formulation and application of rules is 
fraught with uncertainty and difficulty. In his three-step process of inductive, 
deductive and discretionary decision, judges have plenty of institutional room to 
manoeuvre. 74 However, once it is recognised that this takes place within the 
structural and endemic indeterminacy of discursive practice, a depiction of 
rulebased adjudication as factual and easy is far wide of the scholarly mark. The 
appeal of rules is also their greatest weakness. By trying to generalise 
inductively from particular circumstances and then later to particularise 
deductively from general statements, rule-based theories of law overlook the 
main sceptical insight that judging is 'all in the details' and that those details 
are constantly being reconfigured. Rules arise from and speak to social relations 
that are always subject to change and only have any particular meaning as a 
result of their consideration within a specific politico-historical context. 
Moreover, that context is never selfevident but demands an act of delineation 
that implicates values and power: 'the question can be raised not whether a 
politics is implied (it always is), but which politics is implied in . . . a practice 
of contextualisation. '75 
As a matter of professional training and social custom, rule application does 
not lend itself to a definitive account of what it is to follow a rule. To 
declare that someone has followed or obeyed a rule correctly is to say little 
more than they did something the same 'as we do it. '7 The question is not 
whether there are rules or whether they are relied upon they clearly are. 
However, they do not exist as canonical directives that can impersonally 
dispose of cases without interpretive intervention; the meaning of a rule and 
its application never simply is. Rules determine nothing except customary 
reactions and dominant practices. As a social practice, rule application is not 
an analytical issue of formal realisability or causal necessity; conformity with 
is not the same as caused by. This agnosticism is what distinguishes the 
sceptic from the positivists and the nihilists. Simply providing the next number 
in a series is not the same as justifying this manoeuvre as a necessary 
following of a particular rule. In the same way that Newton's Law of Gravity 
did not cause or account for the apple falling, rules do not cause anything to 
happen. In matters of social behaviour, the most that a rule can do is to help 
understand whether the participants in such behaviour believe that they are 
following such a rule. As Wittgenstein concluded in justifying behaviour, 'the 
rule is . . . what is explained, not what does the explaining. '77 Rules are 
rough-and-ready indicators or markers of earlier values that other judges have 
been persuaded had sufficient agreement within or appeal to the relevant 
discursive community. In a non-trivial sense, therefore, every application of a 
rule is a remaking of the rule. Rule application is an occasion on which judges 
acknowledge, consciously or unconsciously, the values that hold certain social 
practices in place. As such, adjudication, no less than lawyering, is through 
and through about values, not facts, and about persuasion, not demonstration. 
Applying rules is a political matter of taking sides: the only questions are 
which and when. 
As regards the traditional distinction between easy and hard cases, it 
should by now be clear that a sceptical account of law has no truck with it or 
need for it. In short, there are no hard cases or easy cases: there are only 
cases. 'Easiness' is not a property or quality that inheres within a case or rule. 
Rules and their application do not arise or make sense outside of an 
interpretive context. The easiness or hardness of cases derives from 
background facts about agreements in judgments, historical contexts and 
social stability. What goes on in easy cases is the same as in hard cases, 
only that its context is less contested and more taken for granted. In this 
sense, Hart is correct when he states that easy cases occur where 'there is 
general agreement that they fall within the scope of a rule, '78 provided that the 
emphasis is firmly on the fact of 'general agreement' and not, as Hart seems 
to put it, on 'the scope of the rule.' The fact of this 'general agreement' 
(whether a matter of social consensus or social hierarchy) is important the 
greater its extent and strength, the greater the existential experience of easy 
cases and legal certainty. 79 Nevertheless, no matter how extensive or deep the 
agreement is, it does not alter the fact that easiness can never become an 
intrinsic feature of the rule itself. The temptation to mistake dominant ways 
of thinking for natural necessity must be studiously resisted; the process is so 
ingrained and uncontroversial as to appear as if the process did not occur. 
My claim, therefore, that many cases are easy and that, as Hart says, 'general 
terms would be useless to us as a medium of communication unless there 
were such familiar, generally unchallenged cases' (p 123) requires that 
'unchallenged' be understood in the postmodern sense as unchallenged in the 
present social circumstances. After all, easy cases are as much a product of 
hermeneutical interpretation as hard cases; they are not an occasion to forego 
the necessity for such interpretation. 
There are two strands of critical response to the sceptical account of easy 
cases and what it means to take rules seriously the 'weird and bizarre' 
and the 'obvious and trite.' The first claims that there are some factual 
applications of rules that are so far-fetched and ludicrous as to be clearly 
outside the sope of the rule and cannot ever reasonably count as potential 
interpretations of the rule. For instance, Greenawalt observes that 'no 
plausible formulation of the statutory crime of theft, under present social 
conditions, will include the ordinary act of scratching one's nose. '80 But 
examples like this seem to miss the whole point of the sceptical account. 
It is not the rule or its formulation that is determinative, but the social 
context and what is considered relevant in it that is significant. The 
constraints are more on people's imagination who but a Da Vinci could have 
imagined cars, computers or spaceships in centuries of old? than on the 
interpretive possibilities imposed by a rule's linguistic expression. In any 
circumstances in which the 'bizarre' or 'weird' situation would actually arise, 
the reasonableness of the interpretation would be much less implausible and 
much more contestable. 81 Greenawalt himself underscores this by qualifying 
his observation as only being itself plausible 'under present social 
conditions. ' In other words, the resort to outrageous examples actually 
underlines the force and extent of the indeterminacy critique if, in matters of 
theft, everything else goes, other than acts like scratching one's nose, then 
the extent of determinate and plausible meaning is so great as to offer no 
practicable constraints on rule application at all. 
The second response insists that there are some circumstances that are so 
obvious and trite that, even under present social conditions, their status as 
easy cases cannot seriously be challenged in that the appropriate outcome of 
applying a rule is beyond serious dispute. For instance, when contemplating 
Hart's rule that 'no vehicles may be taken into the park,' even a critical Fuller 
agrees that there is 'no need to worry about the difference between Fords and 
Cadillacs. '82 Such a bold pronouncement is premature. While it may well be 
that, in most situations and for most people, the make of car will not be 
relevant, it does not follow that it will be so in all possible situations. Again, it 
is the determination of context that is vital, not the rule's formulation. There are 
a number of circumstances in which the make of car might be treated as 
significant in the application of the rule. At a Ford factory or recreational 
facility, 'vehicles' might have come to be interpreted as prohibiting only those 
cars that are not made by Ford, such as Cadillacs; the obvious rationale being 
that there is an important difference between cars made by the park's owner 
and anyone else and that Ford wants to encourage its employees to drive only 
its own cars. After all, any scheme of discourse, of which law is the example 
par excellence, that could once refuse to count women as persons and later 
make women into men, seems a strange arena of human communication to 
insist and rely upon the determinacy, relative or otherwise, of language. 83 
Accordingly, both criticisms serve to confirm that which they claim to 
condemn the difference between the resolution of easy and hard cases is 
not one of intrinsic identity or separate processes, but one of relative 
obviousness based on situated assessments of relevant social contexts and 
agreements. Although my sceptical account stresses imagination over 
technique and persuasion over demonstration, it does not commit me to 
the untenable or nihilistic position that it will always be possible to make the 
application of a rule come out in the way that the judge wants it to. 
Sometimes, cars are vehicles and horses are not. But this is a matter of 
rhetorical achievement, not objective truth or ahistorical determinacy. In such 
circumstances, it does not mean that the sceptical account has failed to give a 
cogent or realistic account of law and judging. On the contrary, the very fact 
that scepticism accepts the existential experience of rule-boundedness is what 
makes it cogent and realistic. Without some explanation or place for that fact, 
a postmodern view of law would be sadly deficient in terms of its own 
commitment to situated and engaged forms of understanding and 
evaluation. Moreover, as almost all theorists and lawyers will agree, 
because a case cannot be brought within a rule, it does not follow that the case 
must fail. Even under arch-formalist accounts of law, judges can either 
fashion an exception to a rule or amend the rule. As Hart states, 'a rule that 
ends with the word "unless . . ." is still a rule. '84 
 
Sceptical judging 
Despite their differences, what unites traditional jurists of a naturalist or 
positivist persuasion is their fear that, without a plausible theory and 
realisable practice of bounded rule application, law will become 
indistinguishable from open-ended political wrangling; adjudication will 
degenerate into a series of ad hoc encounters in which justice will 'be left to 
the unguided, even if experienced, sage sitting under the spreading oak tree.' 
85 However, like most spectres, the threat of nihilistic hordes waiting to 
ransack the juridical citadel of principled decision-making is as much as 
anything else the figment of a fevered jurisprudential .imagination
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: it says 
more about the insecurities of the legal establishment than it does about the 
aspirations of the juristic rebels. Accordingly in this section, I will draw 
together the various fragments on what it means to take rules sceptically, and 
present a more sustained account of what a sceptical approach to judging does 
and does not entail. In particular, I will address the neglected issue of what the 
qualities of a good sceptical judge might be. 
The possibility of sceptical judging is lampooned as, at best , oxymoronic 
and as, at worst, simply moronic. It is suggested that a sceptical approach to 
rules denies the existence of rules and therefore undercuts the possibility of 
anything that might reasonably be recognised as judging; all is mere pretence 
and decision-making is an indulgent will-to-power. For example, in an 
otherwise sophisticated and restrained monograph, Waluchow accuses 
critical legal scholars generally of adopting a rule scepticism: 
according to which there are in actual fact no binding rules at all and judges simply decide 
cases on grounds of their own choosing. These grounds might be political, moral or personal. 
Judges only pretend to be following rules when what they are in fact doing is rationalising their 
blatant, and often abusive and reactionary, exercise of political power. 86 
This is the stuff of rank caricature. Although nihilist critics in their more 
polemical moments might have given unfortunate credibility to such 
assessments, this dystopian vision of sceptical judging is neither warranted nor 
inevitable. While some judges and academics might well engage in the 
occasional cynical manipulation of rules and ought to be held to account for 
such intellectual or political ingenuity, it is far from radical scepticism's claim 
that rules cannot or ought not to be taken seriously; what more often occurs is 
the good faith attempt to interpret and apply a rule so as to produce a 
satisfactory result. Judges do follow and apply rules, but what is the relevant 
rule and what it means to follow or apply it is always up for grabs. 
Consequently, for postmodernists, law remains primarily a system of rules, 
provided that its existence and operation is understood in a radically sceptical 
sense. 
The common allegation that under a sceptical account 'rules serve not as 
sources of ex ante guidance, but as vehicles of ex post legitimation of 
decisions reached without regard for the rules,' is mistaken. 87 The sceptical 
claim actually made is that judges do not stand outside the rules but inhabit 
the rules in a particular way. They are always situated within a context of 
freedom and constraint -never fully constrained nor ever entirely free. Judges 
give meaning to rules and their own lives in the constant struggle to 
negotiate the forces of freedom and constraint that constitute the rules 
and their own lives; they are freely constrained and constrainedly free. 
Indeed, freedom and constraint can only be made sense of reciprocally. 
The rule-engaged judge is neither context-dependent nor 
contexttranscendent; the rules and the rule user are enmeshed in a 
mutually affecting relationship. 88 Thus, a sceptical account of adjudication 
takes seriously both the restrictive pull of rules and the liberating push of 
interpretation. One can neither dispense with rules nor with interpretation; 
each is what makes the other tick. Within a postmodern version of law there 
is not only no set of rules that stands apart from interpretive attempts at 
hermeneutical appropriation, but there is no literal interpretation one that 
claims to be transparently representational rather than opaquely constitutive -
against which other interpretations can be contrasted. Similarly, a postmodern 
approach is suitably sceptical about the traditional insistence that whenever 
judges attend to the consequences of applying a rule they are no longer 
applying the rule in any serious sense. It is willingly acknowledged that, 
whatever else they might be doing, judges are not engaged in rule application 
when they deliberately use rules as ex post justifications for decisions. 
However, sceptics argue that some resort to consequences is an unavoidably 
practical feature of rule application if 'resort to consequences' is used by 
traditionalists to refer to certain aspects of the rules' informing context. Without 
reference to something beyond the verbal formulation of the rule itself, it is 
nonsensical to talk about rule application. As I have been at pains to 
demonstrate, rule application only makes sense as a dynamic exercise in 
normative judgment,  not as a passive act of unreflective conformity. 
Consequently, sceptics are only troubled when judges attend to consequences 
and nothing else ; that is, when they forego or ignore their own good faith 
attempts at interpretation of the rules. The fact that judges arrive at different or 
even contradictory applications of particular rules is less of a concern than the 
failure of judges to take the rules seriously. While judges are obligated to 
apply rules, they are not obliged to reach certain decisions. Of course, to 
concede that there may be several applications of a rule that count as valid or 
legitimate is to confirm that law is rife with indeterminacy and that judging is 
riven with choices. As such, traditional jurists need not so much fear that 
anything goes as a matter of judicial decision that judges might decide cases on 
the basis of a coin toss, the litigant's hair colour, astrological charts or the like 
-but that, as a matter of rule application and through a process of rational 
disagreement, judges might justify almost any outcome. Again, a sceptical 
practice does not reduce itself to brute preference nor dispense with the 
possibility of rational debate. Scepticism simply insists that the idea of 
rational debate be understood and practised in a suitably 
sceptical way. 
As Hart stresses, any credible description of rule application must be able 
to account for the beliefs of participants as to what they are doing or think 
they are doing. While legal theorists need not share or endorse the beliefs of 
participants in the legal community, they must offer an explanation of that 
behaviour as it is understood by its participants.  Consequently, the fact that 
judges experience themselves applying and being morally bound by rules is a 
vital factor that cannot be ignored, even if it need not be endorsed or shared: 
'description may still be description, even when what is described is an 
evaluation. '89 Nothing that I have said contravenes this injunction. My 
sceptical account of what it is to take rules seriously accepts that a rule's 
existence will be relevant to the question of what judges do and should do. 
However, the need to incorporate judges' feeling of bindingness leaves open the 
key issue of how to fix what it is that that bindingness applies to namely, the 
rule's meaning. Notwithstanding Hart's emphasis on the beliefs of insiders, he 
posits a false tension between those who 'accept and voluntarily co-operate in 
maintaining the rules' and those who 'reject the rules and attend to them only 
. . . as a possible sign of punishment. '90 In so far as this division is 
intended to undercut the sceptics' claims about rules, it only bites if there 
is some largely objective, determinate and uncontroversial way to ascertain 
the meaning of rules. Because there is no such method, it is a toothless 
distinction. As I have tried to show throughout, the sceptical judge both 
'accepts' rather than 'rejects' the rules and, at the same time, 'maintains' 
them as only 'a possible sign of punishment. ' 
Despite the apocalpytic predictions and dire warnings of traditional 
scholars, there is nothing about my approach that will necessarily change how 
judges actually apply rules. A different appreciation of what it is to apply a 
rule has no necessary impact on the practice of rule application: theory does 
not alter practice in and of itself. Judges and lawyers will still go on 
interpreting particular rules in particular ways. But what might change is the 
cogency and bindingness of particular applications in particular circumstances 
in light of the altered theoretical understanding of what it means to apply a rule: 
'once we admit the rules are mutable and inextricable from material social 
practice, we will at least experience a psychological change in the way we 
perceive our roles as legal actors. '91 There will still be general agreement on 
what particular rules mean and individual judges will still experience exactly 
the same degree of (in)determinacy, but the vital justification for that result 
will be subverted and the question of authority will be challenged. Judges will 
no longer be able to claim that 'the rule made me do it,' but will have to take 
greater responsibility for judicial decisions and their social consequences. 
Ifjudges believe that they should follow rules for the simple reason that they 
are rules, they will be lost when the rules are ambiguous or run out. 
Democratic responsibility is not about unthinking obeisance to external 
rules; the denial of complexity and ambiguity in the service of the Rule of 
Law is the epitome of irresponsible behaviour. Instead, sceptical judges 
understand that their institutional duty is best fulfilled by taking stands on 
particular rules and being accountable for those choices. Indeed, Hart himself 
accepted that scepticism had two major and beneficial effects for the 
adjudicative enterprise -the practical and the political: 
first, that [judges] should always suspect, although not always in the end reject, any claim that 
existing legal rules or precedents were constraints strong and complete enough to 
determine what a court's decision should be without other extra-legal considerations; 
secondly, that judges should not seek to bootleg silently into the law their own conceptions of the 
law's aims or justice or social policy or other extra-legal elements required for decision, but 
should openly identify and discuss them.92 
In prescient fashion, Hart was hinting, even if he did not concede, that the 
battery of adjudicative techniques for rule application did not amount to a 
selfcontained technology: they only made sense as part of a larger 
understanding of law as a rhetorical enterprise. Always a part of and not apart 
from power, law is a discourse of persuasion. Within such an understanding, 
non-apologetic legal theory demands a vigorous hermeneutics of scepticism that 
can penetrate the heavy jurisprudential camouflage in which power habitually 
disguises its insidious legal operation. While these competing strategies of 
adjudication are passed off as ideologically unaligned, they are rhetorical 
resources in a continuing struggle for the hermeneutical soul of law; their 
impact and success will vary with context and audience. Any meaning that gels 
is a rhetorical function of a temporary and provisional agreement between 
contending parties, not a lasting or concluding recognition of a pre-existing 
ground for interpretive truth. However, there is nothing arbitrary or capricious 
about this process; values, convictions and interpretations are no less real or 
compelling because they are contingent and historical. And they are no more 
real or compelling because they are underwritten by the spurious logic of some 
pseudo-neutral interpretive strategy. As Fish puts it, '[not] all rhetorical 
constructions are equal, just that they are equally rhetorical. '93 In the sceptical 
almanac, the logic of the law is the rhetorical experience of life. 
 
A new craft 
What would be the qualities of good sceptical judges? What kind of people 
would make the best sceptical judges? While they would possess adequate 
technical skills, like a sophisticated grasp of rule application, these notoriously 
formal and abstract talents would not be central to a transformed practice of 
adjudication. Under sceptical tutelage, law becomes a practical activity in 
which judges would bear more resemblance to artists than technicians. 
Lawyers' highest achievement is not a reduction of law's materials to an 
elaborate and exhaustive system of rules; the effect, if not the intent, of a limited 
depiction of lawyers' special and distinctive expertise is that it too easily 
functions as a ruse for relieving themselves of the democratic responsibility 
to justify their power and authority by recourse to the real-world pressure of 
getting the job done. However, the best legal craftspersons are not those who 
simply reproduce mechanically and mindlessly old arguments and trite 
analogies, but those who can rework legal materials in an imaginative and 
stylish way.94 To be worthy of their professional prestige, lawyers and judges 
must nurture a sense of social justice and a feel for political vision unless they 
are to become only hired hands for vested interests: 'technique without ideals 
is a menace; ideals without technique are a mess. '95 A bare legal craft can too 
easily acquire the elite habits of a masonic order and fail to meet the civic 
specifications of its official calling: a job well done is not always its own 
reward. Lawyers must be technicians, but they must also be designers and 
innovators who place their practised craft in the service of the disadvantaged 
and disenfranchised in society. As things presently stand, legal craft seems 
designed to serve only its own parochial and formalist ends. 
The informing image of postmodern lawyers and judges is of industrial 
artists. Working with whatever materials are at hand, they mix and match 
them in an imaginative way that is a contingent expression of their artistic 
convictions about truth, beauty, justice, etc in a modern society. Unhindered 
by debates about the true nature of art or the correctness of artistic insight, the 
excellence of their craft is in their connectedness with the world, not some 
arcane retreat from it. Industrial artists are industrial precisely because they do 
not live exclusively in the studio, deal exclusively with paints and canvas, and 
speak exclusively to dealers and critics. Indeed, they are industrial in part 
because their contribution so often disappears into the product, blended with 
the contribution of other artists. But it is also bent to the discipline of 
technology, market constraints, popular tastes, union rules and other forces 
which marginalise them and their artistic aspirations and talents. The effect 
of this, over time, is to habituate them to their role in industry and to cause 
them to distance themselves from the effete world of Art. But, at the same 
time, they are changing industry by the improvements that they are able to 
make in the practicality, aesthetics and cost-efficiency of kettles and cars. 
For lawyers or artists the best accolades are earned not for their technical 
prowess but their capacity to engender local hope in the struggle to transform 
experience, to overcome suffering and to endow others with opportunities to 
remake their own world.96 
To accomplish such a task, emphasis will be placed on the substantive 
qualities that judges possess as individuals and citizens. It is people who have a 
diversity of experience, who can open themselves to the situations of others and 
who value the worth of compassion, sensitivity and humanity. While it will 
not disqualify the hard-headed or the unsentimental, such a revised judicial 
mandate will require the capacity to be creative and imaginative in the use of 
rules. In so doing, such judges will not be acting in an arbitrary, idiosyncratic or 
ideological way. By working to bring their values and commitments to 
articulate consciousness in order to understand and interrogate them, they will 
be acting with the candour that democracy expects and taking responsibility 
for what they do in a way democracy encourages. By rejecting the hackneyed 
and unsustainable notion of an entirely differentiated role, judges might begin 
to gain the respect of the public and themselves. In the same way that 'good 
oratory is a good person speaking well, '97 so good judging is a good person 
acting well. Of course, the notion of what qualities or characteristics go to 
make up the 'good person' is itself always open to debate and disagreement. 
Similarly, there is no magical guide to be followed as to what judges should 
do or how they should do it in any specific or conflicted situation. Sceptical 
judges will not shy away from a resort to values and will ensure that those 
values are always kept in play, that they remain open to reconsideration and 
that responsibility is taken for them. 
Accordingly, by celebrating the fact that law is the continuation of politics 
by other rhetorical means, sceptical judges will recognise their inevitable role as 
agents of political activism. Rather than talk with Dworkin and Fuller about 
the common law 'working itself pure,' sceptical judges will be content to know 
that, through their own efforts and imagination, the law is simply 'working 
itself. '98 However, none of this should be taken as implying that, when 
released from its allegiance to traditional prescriptions, judicial caution should 
be thrown to the wind and the courts begin to operate as a clearing house for 
all political disputes and policy-making. As formalists rightly note, 'giving 
away the traditional store . . . would be drastic and dangerous . . . unlikely to 
help the less powerful members of society. '99 The postmodern challenge is to 
transform the courts so that they abandon their formalist ways and accept 
their political responsibility; it is not a ploy to usurp democratic authority 
from citizens at large. 
Along with any efforts to re-vision the judicial craft in line with a more 
sceptical and democratic optic, it will be essential to ensure that the sites for 
democratic dialogue are actively multiplied so that a broader range of voices 
could be heard in society's policy-making. There is only so much that courts 
can or should do in a society that is committed to democratic governance. 
Nonetheless, in so far as courts are likely to play some role in the practice and 
theory of democratic justice, it will be imperative to work toward a situation in 
which the personnel of the courts are diversified and democratised. On the 
basis that different people bring different experience to the task of applying 
rules, the need to ensure that the elite ranks of the judicial and legal 
profession are opened up along more varied class, gender, racial, ethnic, 
sexual and political lines is paramount. Of course, the appointment of women, 
black or gay judges will not guarantee change or make the law more 
progressive. It is mistaken to believe that anything necessarily follows from 
the identity or experience of a judge: it is as wrong to attribute a homogeneity 
of views to disadvantaged groups as it is to pretend that those views will not 
be different to those of advantaged groups. Nonetheless, the increased 
presence of such people will increase the likelihood that a different perspective 
and vision of justice will be brought to bear upon the adjudicative process. 
While there are not nor can there be any metaphysical certainties, the 
institutional chances of transforming law and judging are greatly improved by 
opening it up to those excluded for so long: robust dialogue is more conducive 
to the democratic temperament and civic advancement than insulated 
monologues. This affirmative vision of sceptical judging 'is not radical in 
itself but is radical in the context of the prevailing orthodoxy.' 100 
Similarly, within a postmodern legal culture, the role and representation of 
the jury would be greatly expanded. As an occasion for democratic 
devolution, jury empowerment would bring a neglected challenge to the 
aristocratic instincts of legal professionalism and might invigorate the timbre 
and range of dialogic debates. Moreover, it would represent a postmodern 
putsch against the legal hierocracy. By changing the civic members of the jury 
from passive observers to active participants, the legal process might begin to 
fulfil its democratic commitments. After all, law involves the lives of society's 
citizens and is much too important to be left to lawyers. Moreover, by 
withdrawing the fate of the polity from the clutches of lawyers, it might 
become possible for citizens to overcome the dispiriting belief that, unless 
there is something large, powerful and ahistorical on their side to support their 
claims -like the law -they need not assert their right to govern themselves. 101 
A revitalised jury system is one way to relieve the symptoms of democratic 
ennui and to prevent further political disempowerment. 
 
 
Shovelling smoke 
If, as Oliver Wendell Holmes said, 'lawyers spend a great deal of time 
shovelling smoke,' 102 then legal theorists devote an even greater deal of time 
to producing it. Under the guise of elucidation, too much jurisprudential 
writing tends to mystify law and adjudication. On the other hand, a sceptical 
account works as a gust of fresh air to blow away much of the juristic fog that 
shrouds the doings of judges; it seeks to lay bare, not do away with, the 
creative craft of rule application. As part of a larger postmodern project, the 
ambition is not so much to dispel the uncertainty and complexity that is 
inherent in the adjudicative task, but to understand it better and encourage 
judges and critics to turn it to transformative effect. With a healthy sceptical 
attitude, judges might immunise themselves from the formalist contagion that 
both positivists and naturalists continue to spread. In this way, not only will 
lawyers begin to appreciate that they are engaged in a language game of 
rhetorical politics, they might accept that adjudication and rule application is 
not an escape from political responsibility but one of the most compelling 
occasions for its dutiful antl satisfying discharge. 
In substantiating a sceptical account of law and rules, I hope to have 
calmed implicit Hartian fears that, without the hard core of settled meaning, 
there cannot be law 'in some centrally important sense' and 'the notion of 
rules controlling courts' decisions is senseless'; this is an unwarranted 
indictment of responsible scepticism and participatory democracy. 103 It is 
simply not the case that, unless words have a context-transcendent meaning, 
the possibility of governance according to law will have vanished and anarchy 
will be loosed on an unsuspecting populace. While there is never a hard core 
of settled meaning, there is often a soft centre of temporary meaning. There 
are, no doubt, instances of cynical rule manipulation by judges and 
lawyers, but there is nothing in my postmodern refocusing of rule-based 
adjudication that denies or compromises Hart's observation that 'for the 
most part decisions . . . are reached . . . by genuine effort to conform to rules 
consciously taken as guiding standards of decision. '104 However, my 
sceptical approach does insist that nothing necessarily follows from making a 
'genuine effort to conform to rules consciously taken as guiding standards 
of decision.' Moreover, the idea and practice of sceptical judging is best suited 
to the political ambitions of a modern polity that aspires to be truly 
democratic. 
For Hart, the realists' tendency to treat rules as 'playthings' 105 was to be 
strenuously resisted. When characterised in a nihilistic and trivialising vein, 
this reaction is understandable. But when the 'play' of rule application is 
understood in the more serious sceptical sense, it becomes much less 
disturbing and much more attractive. It begins to capture the style and 
substance of a postmodern politics in which citizens, including judges, are 
empowered by the recognition that rules are always up for grabs and that 
struggles to apply them partake of life's fluidity. Of course, such a view of 
politics as 'playful impertinence' might be seen to be indulgent and offensive 
to those whose lives are lived under economic and social oppression. To this 
objection there is no better response than that the practice of 'politics as play' 
offers the most seripus and pertinent challenge to such suffering. Under the 
view of law and life as an infinite game, play ceases to be only a pastime and 
relief from the grinding earnstness of life and rule application. Instead, it 
becomes an activity of living that is intended to permeate all situations of 
social interaction and that strives to 'open[ ] political spaces for agonistic 
relations of adversarial respect. '106 Within these patches of instability, 
conflicts of power might be challenged and robbed of their absolute and final 
predetermination in a way that ordinary politics and finite games do not. None of 
this suggests that there would be an anarchic lack of standards; there would be 
new and changing standards that combine the playful and the serious in a 
defiantly pluralistic amalgam of style and substance. 
Within this sceptical understanding of law and politics, political players are 
capable of imagining and opening themselves up to possibilities other than those 
presently available. They are not actors in another's story, but they are committed 
to be 'joyful poets of the story that continues to originate what they cannot 
finish.' 107 In such a postmodern society, politics is not something that people 
choose to do, but something that people always live. Consequently, when involved 
in the play of rule application, judges and jurists can continue to produce and 
shovel smoke or they can come clean on their political affiliations in a more open 
and responsible way. By taking rules sceptically and by diversifying the judicial 
ranks, the courts can become one more venue for the infinite game of democratic 
transformation. Moreover, in doing this it might be possible to confound and 
remedy Hart's complaint that 'in law, as elsewhere, we can know and yet not 
understand.' 108 Suitably read and re-viewed, The Concept of Law still has a major 
role to play in that progressive challenge. 
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